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1 Introduction
In recent prominent contributions, Bernheim and Rangel (2007, 2009) (hereafter
BR) and Rubinstein and Salant (2008) (hereafter RS) model choice problems where
observed choices are determined by frames (RS) or ancillary conditions (BR). A
frame is dened as an "observable information that is irrelevant in the rational
assessment of the alternatives, but nonetheless a¤ects choice" (RS, abstract). An
ancillary condition is "an exogenous feature of the choice environment that may
a¤ect behavior, but is not taken as relevant to a social planners evaluation" (Bern-
heim and Rangel, 2008, pp. 4). Examples of frames or ancillary conditions include
the order in which candidates are listed on a ballot, default alternatives, salience of
the alternative, deadline for making a choice or list of alternatives with an aspiration
threshold (RS), the point in time at which a choice is made, the manner in which
alternatives are presented, the labeling of a particular option as the status-quo
(BR), etc.
A key dilemma raised by behavioral economics is whether welfare assessments
can rely on observed choice alone. When choice is a¤ected by frames or ancillary
conditions, the issue is whether such frames or ancillary conditions matter from
a welfare viewpoint. There are two diametrically opposite views: (i) frames and
ancillary conditions, via their impact on choices, do not matter for making welfare
assessments, and (ii) frames and ancillary conditions, though taken as given by the
decision-maker at the point when choices are made, matter for welfare purposes.
BR and RS endorse the rst view. Both papers construct binary relations solely
from observed choice and show that such derived binary relations can be used to
rank actions available to the decision-maker from a welfare viewpoint: frames or
ancillary conditions do not matter in the welfare ranking.
Arguably, there are instances in which frames could be viewed as endogenous.
For example, RS consider a deadline as an exogenous frame, although there is con-
siderable empirical evidence that people self-impose deadlines to overcome procrasti-
nation (see for example Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002). The number of alternatives
that the decision-maker actually considers (limited focus) is also viewed as an exoge-
nous frame. However, limited focus can be used strategically as a self-control device
preventing the decision-maker from embarking in a hazardous activity which may
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later regret (Carrillo and Mariotti, 2000). Finally, RS consider the case in which
decision-makers encounter the alternatives in the form of a list and choose given an
aspirations threshold which is exogenous. There is also vast evidence, however, that
aspirations adapt to actions (see for example Easterlin, 2001).
Given the above evidence, this paper studies a class of decision problems with
endogenous frames. We compare, and contrast, the relationship between choice and
welfare in our set-up with those in BRs and RSs choice theoretic models.
In this paper, a frame is broadly interpreted to include di¤erent psychological
states such as reference points, beliefs, emotions, temptations, moods, aspirations,
etc. There is work from social psychology and economics which suggests that psy-
chological states a¤ect behavior1. In addition, there is also a great deal of evidence
which suggests that what a person does (or expect to do) determines her psycholog-
ical states. Baron (2008, pp. 68) argues that emotions are partly under our control:
individuals can "induce or suppress emotions in themselves almost on cue." Some
people may reshape their character, so that their emotional responses change. Albert
Bandura (1986) denes reciprocal determinism to the view of human functioning as
the product of a dynamic interplay of personal, behavioral, and environmental in-
uence: the way in which people interpret the results of their own behavior informs
and alters their environments and personal factors which, in turn, inform and alter
subsequent behavior through an "environmental feedback e¤ect."
Section 2 takes into account these insights from psychology and introduces a
decision-making model with endogenous frames. We endogenize frames in the fol-
lowing way. We distinguish a pre-decision frame from a post-decision frame and
assume that the post-decision frame depends on a single-valued map modelling the
feedback e¤ect from actions and the pre-decision frame. The individual faces a de-
cision problem which include a given pre-decision frame, a feedback map and a set
of feasible actions. As a preliminary step, it is useful to consider a "short-run" deci-
sion problem which consists in choosing an action from some feasible set of actions
given an initial pre-decision frame which generates a post-decision frame. Our focus,
however, is on the "long-run" outcomes of a recurrent decision situation where the
1Elster (1998) provides a review on how individual choices are a¤ected by emotions; Sen (1977)
discusses how personal values shape choices; Appadurai (2004) studies the relationship between
aspirations and behavior.
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decision-maker repeatedly chooses from the same set of feasible actions.
In order to describe the long-run outcomes of such a recurrent decision situation,
since post-decision frames depend on the action chosen and the pre-decision frame,
we dene a feasible, consistent decision state as a pair of an action and a frame
where the current pre-decision frame coincides with the post-decision frame and can
be generated by some sequence of actions starting from the initial pre-decision frame.
In general, we show that the set of feasible, consistent decision states may be empty.
We, then, introduce two assumptions, one where the post-decision frame depends
only on actions (and not on the pre-decision frame) and the other where frames are
exogenous so that the post-decision frame is always the pre-decision frame. Any of
these two assumptions ensures that the set of feasible, consistent decision states is
non-empty. We conduct most of our analysis under either of these two assumptions.
When the set of feasible, consistent decision states is non-empty, we study two
distinct decision problems. A standard decision problem (where the decision-maker
is rational) is one where the decision-maker chooses a feasible, consistent decision
state that maximizes ex post (experienced) utility (i.e., the decision-maker under-
stands, and internalizes, the feedback mechanism). A behavioral decision problem
(where the decision-maker is boundedly rational) is one where the decision-maker
takes the pre-decision frame (mistakenly) as xed when choosing actions although
an outcome of a behavioral decision problem is required to be feasible and consistent.
In that sense, the boundedly rational choice is also stable.2
We show the link between our model and models of reference-dependent prefer-
ences where the frames (i.e. reference points) are also actions (Kahneman-Tversky,
1979; Tversky-Kahneman, 1991). We present a number of di¤erent examples to
show how behavioral decisions can be used to capture phenomenon such as addic-
tion, aspirations failure and "the grass is always greener on the other side". We,
then, explore the relationship between the standard and behavioral decision prob-
2 In a companion paper "Behavioral Decisions and Welfare" (Dalton and Ghosal, 2010) we pro-
vide the axiomatic characterization, via choice correspondences, of standard vs behavioral decisions
in a class of models where frames depend solely on actions via a feedback e¤ect. In this paper, we
generalize this decision model by distinguishing between a pre-decision and a post-decision frame.
Moreover, here we focus on comparing decision-making with endogenous frames to choice with
exogenous frames or ancillary conditions.
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lems. In scenarios where the post-decision frame depends only on actions (and not
on the pre-decision frame), we provide a necessary and su¢ cient condition under
which the set of standard decision outcomes is a subset of the set of behavioral de-
cision outcomes. In scenarios where frames are exogenous, the set of standard and
behavioral solutions are identical.
Section 3 summarizes the choice-theoretic framework in BR and RS and section
4 claries the relationship between their frameworks and our model. We contrast
our decision model to the choice frameworks of BR and RS as follows. In scenarios
where the post-decision frame depends only on actions (and not on a pre-decision
frame), we show that (a) the "rational" ranking over decision states induces a unique,
complete ranking of actions, and (b) this ranking agrees with the BR (and RS)
ranking where both are dened when the set of standard decision outcomes is a
subset of the set of behavioral decision outcomes. However, there are examples
where the two rankings do not agree where both are dened. Finally, in scenarios
with exogenous frames, we show that the projection of the "rational" ranking over
decision states on actions agrees with the BR (and RS) ranking where both are
dened.
In section 5, we analyze the policy implications of our argument. Clearly, when
the outcomes of both standard and behavioral decision problems coincide, there is
no case for any sort of intervention by a social planner. In contrast, in scenarios
where there are multiple welfare ranked outcomes, the "libertarian paternalism"
approach advocated by Thaler and Sunstein (2003) that only seeks to alter the
frames or ancillary conditions could work. In general, however, we argue that the
scope for such policy interventions is limited and if "hard paternalism" (i.e. directly
constraining the choices of individuals) is to be avoided, interventions should aim
to ensure that decision-makers internalize, with high probability, the feedback from
actions to frames.
The last section concludes and discusses directions for further research.
2 Decisions With Frames
In our framework, the objects of preferences are ordered pairs (a; q) 2 AQ where
a is an "action" and q is a "frame". Both A and Q are non-empty and nite
5
universal sets (i.e., sets of all conceivable actions and frames). Any (a; q) with
a 2 A and q 2 Q is a decision state. The preferences of the decision-maker are
denoted by , a complete, transitive binary relation ranking pairs of decision states
in (AQ)  (AQ). The expression f(a; q) ; (a0; q0)g 2 is written as (a; q) 
(a0; q0) and is to be read as "(a; q) is weakly preferred to (a0; q0) by the decision-
maker".
We distinguish between a pre-decision frame q0 and a post-decision frame q.
There is a map  : A  Q ! Q modelling the feedback e¤ect from actions and a
pre-decision frame to a post-decision frame. It is assumed that  (a; q) is non-empty
and single-valued for each (a; q) 2 AQ.
The preferences of the decision-maker reects some form of ex-post utility (in-
terpreted as experienced utility) which depends on the chosen action a and the
post-decision frame q. Following Harsanyi (1954), we go beyond the assumptions
of the usual ordinal utility theory and assume the intra-personal comparability of
utility. We assume not only that the decision-maker is able to rank di¤erent ele-
ments in A for a given q but also that she is able to assess the subjective satisfaction
she derives from an action when the post-decision frame is q with the subjective
satisfaction she derives from another action when the post-decision frame is q0 6= q.
This formulation is critical in order to make meaningful welfare comparisons.
As a preliminary step, we consider a "short run" concept of the decision problem,
consisting of a non-empty feasible set A0  A and a pre-decision frame q0 2 Q.
The decision-maker chooses some a 2 A0, and this induces the post-decision frame
 (a; q0). A decision state (a; q) is a "short run" outcome of a decision problem if
and only if
(a; q0) 
 
a0; q0

for all a0 2 A0 with q = (a; q0):
In this paper, our focus will be on the "long run" (equivalently, steady state)
outcomes of a recurrent decision situation, where a decision-maker faces the same
non-empty feasible set A0  A repeatedly, starting with a frame q0 in "period 0";
in each period t > 0, the pre-decision frame is given by the post-decision frame for
t  1.
Given A0 and q0, a decision state (a; q) is feasible if there exists a sequence
(a1; q1); ::::; (aT ; qT ) such that qt = (at; qt 1) and at 2 A0 for all 0 < t  T with
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aT = a and qT = q.3 Finally, given A0, we dene a consistent decision state as a
pair (a; q) such that q = (a; q) and a 2 A0.
A "long run" decision outcome is a decision state that is both feasible and
consistent. The question is whether starting from any arbitrary non-empty set
A0  A and any pre-decision frame q0, a feasible consistent decision state always
exists. Example 1 below shows that, in general, this is not the case.
Example 1: Consider the feedback function depicted below, where the rst
column represents the set of feasible actions, the rst row represents the pre-decision
frames and the intermediate cells are the post-decision frames:
q1 q2
a1 q2 q1
a2 q2 q1
I.e. q2 = (a; q1) but also q1 = (a; q2), for each a 2 fa1; a2g. Clearly, there is no
decision state such that q = (a; q) for a 2 fa1; a2g.
Moreover, the set of consistent decision states and feasible decision states may
have an empty intersection starting from an arbitrary q0.
Example 2: Consider the feedback function depicted below:
q1 q2 q3
a1 q2 q1 q3
a2 q2 q1 q3
a3 q2 q1 q3
i.e. q2 = (a; q1), q1 = (a; q2) and q3 = (a; q3) for each a 2 fa1; a2; a3g. The set
of consistent decision states is f(a0; q0) : (a; q3) ; a 2 fa1; a2; a3gg. However, starting
from qi, i = 1; 2, the set of feasible decision states is f(a0; q0) : (a; qi) ; a 2 fa1; a2; a3g ; i = 1; 2g
which has an empty intersection with set of consistent decision states. 
To deal with these two problems, we introduce the following assumption on the
feedback function and conduct most of our analysis in terms of it.
Assumption 1: There exists a function f(a) such that f(a) = (a; q) for all
a 2 A.
3Notice that, in general, the set of feasible decision states depends on q0 (see for instance Example
1).
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Under Assumption 1, post-decision frames depend only on the actions chosen by
the decision-maker and not on the pre-decision frame q0.
The following example illustrates a feedback function that satises this assump-
tion:
Example 3: The feedback function is:
q1 q2 q3
a1 q2 q2 q2
a2 q3 q3 q3
a3 q1 q1 q1
i.e. q2 = f(a1) = (a1; q), q3 = f(a2) = (a2; q) and q1 = f(a3) = (a3; q) for each
q 2 fq1; q2; q3g. Notice that, in this case, the non-empty set of feasible, consistent
decision states is (ai; f(ai)), i = 1; 2; 3.
Under Assumption 1, it is possible to dene a set of frames Q0 = F (A0) where
Q0 = fq0 : q = (a0; f(a)) for some a; a0 2 A0g, i.e., the set of frames that the indi-
vidual can generate by making choices from A0. In this way, the set of feasible
consistent decision states f(a0; q0) : q = f(a) for some a 2 A0g is a non-empty subset
of the set of feasible decision states A0  F (A0).
At some points in the paper, we will also analyze other special case (i.e. a case
in which Assumption 1 does not hold): exogenous frames. This is dened by the
following assumption on the feedback e¤ect:
Assumption 2: For each q 2 Q, q = (a; q) for all a 2 A.
In this case, the set of feasible consistent decision states depends only on the
initial pre-decision frame q0. The set of decision states that are feasible for a given
decision problem is f(a; q0) : a 2 A0g; then for all a0 2 A0; (a0; q0) is consistent. The
following example shows a feedback function that satises Assumption 2.
Example 4: The feedback function is
q1 q2
a1 q1 q2
a2 q1 q2
i.e. qi = (a; qi), for each q 2 fq1; q2g. If the pre-decision frame is qi, i = 1; 2, each
(a; qi), a 2 fa1; a2g is a feasible, consistent decision state.
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Note that although assumptions 1 and 2 are su¢ cient conditions for the set of
feasible and consistent decision states to be non-empty (for any non-empty A0 and
pre-decision-frame q0), neither of these two conditions is necessary. The following
example provides a feedback e¤ect that illustrates this point:
Example 5: Consider the feedback function depicted below:
q1 q2
a1 q2 q1
a2 q1 q2
i.e. q2 = (a1; q1), q1 = (a2; q1), q1 = (a1; q2), q2 = (a2; q2). In this case, the
feedback function doesnt satisfy either Assumption 1 or Assumption 2. However,
if the pre-decision frame is q1, the feasible consistent decision state is (a2; q1) and if
the pre-decision frame is q2, the feasible consistent decision state is (a2; q2). 
In what follows, we study decision problems, indexed by A0; q0, where the set of
feasible, consistent decision states ("long run" decision states) is non-empty. Given
Example 5, where required, we will directly assume that this set is non-empty.
Now that we have described the structure of the decision problem and the choice
that individuals have to make, we are in conditions to introduce the normative
principle about how decisions are made. Our focus will be on "long run" decision
states corresponding to the outcomes of two distinct decision problems: standard
and behavioral.
1. Standard Decision Problems
Fix a non-empty feasible set of actions A0  A and a pre-decision frame q0. Sup-
pose the set of feasible, consistent decision states is non-empty. A standard decision
problem (interpreted as rational decision-making) is one where the decision-maker
chooses a pair (a; q) from within the set of feasible consistent decision states (i.e.,
the decision-maker understands, and fully internalizes, the feedback mechanism). A
feasible consistent decision state (a; q) is the outcome of a standard decision problem
(a rational choice) if and only if
(a; q)   a0; q0 for all  a0; q0 with q0 = (a0; q0):
Let M denote the set of all outcomes of a standard decision problem.
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The set of feasible consistent decision states is f(a; f(a)) : a 2 A0g under As-
sumption 1, and f(a; q0) : a 2 A0g under Assumption 2. The most preferred elements
of any of these two subset are elements of M:
Under the assumption that the preference order  is complete and transitive,
as long as the set of feasible consistent decision sets is non-empty and nite, M is
non-empty as well.
2. Behavioral Decision Problems
Fix a non-empty feasible set of actions A0  A and a pre-decision frame q0.
Suppose the set of feasible consistent decision states is non-empty. A behavioral
decision problem (interpreted as boundedly rational decision-making) is one where
the decision-maker wrongly assumes that the current pre-decision frame is xed
when choosing an action. A feasible, consistent decision state (a; q) is the outcome
of a behavioral decision problem if and only if
(a; q)   a0; q for all a0 2 A with q = (a; q):
Let E denote the set of outcomes of a behavioral decision problem. We interpret E
as an equilibrium concept for repeated decisions where at each period, the behav-
ioral individual optimizes wrongly assuming that the current pre-decision frame is
xed. That is, given q0, A0, the choices of the behavioral decision maker generates
a sequence of decision states (at; qt : t > 0) such that
(at; qt 1) 
 
a0; qt 1

for all a0 2 A0 with qt = (at; qt 1):
If in some period the decision-maker reaches an element of E, he will choose that
element for ever.4
Notice that, under Assumption 2, E = f(a; q0) : (a; q0)  (a0; q0) for all a0 2 Ag =
M . Thus behavioural and rationaldecision-making are equivalent when frames are
exogenous.
4Note that, in our model, it is rational to maximize ex-post (experienced) utility. A behavioral
decision-maker, however, typically fails to do so. We acknowledge that this view is subject to
criticism (see for example, Bernheim 2009)). However, other competing normative criteria proposed
in the literature of behavioral welfare economics have also important drawbacks. Kahneman and
Sugden (2005), while acknowledging the criticisms of the normative position adopted here, suggest
that it could represent a useful starting point for welfare analysis.
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Under Assumption 1, E contains those feasible consistent decision states (a; f(a))
such that (a; f(a))  (a0; f(a)) for all a0 2 A.5 It is important to acknowledge that,
even when E is non-empty, E = M and Assumption 1 holds, E may be never
reached as the following example demonstrates.6
Example 6: The feedback function is:
q1 q2 q3
a1 q1 q1 q1
a2 q2 q2 q2
a3 q3 q3 q3
i.e. qi = f(ai) = (a1; q) for each q 2 fq1; q2; q3g. Notice that, in this case, the
non-empty set of feasible consistent decision states is (ai; qi), i = 1; 2; 3. Assume
that the preferences  are represented by an utility function u : A  Q ! < and
the payo¤ table is
q1 q2 q3
a1 0 1 0
a2 1 0 0
a3 0 0 1
Suppose the initial pre-decision frame is q1. Then the sequence of decision states
generated by a behavioral decision-maker is (a2; q1), (a1; q2), (a2; q1), ... . E =M =
fa3; q3g ; but E is never reached. 
Remarks
Remark 1. Reference-dependent preferences
It is convenient to relate the model of decision-making studied here to the case
of reference-dependent preferences where frames are also actions (i.e. Q = A) and a
chosen action becomes a post-decision frame (a; q) = a for all (a; q) 2 AQ. In this
case, the ranking of consistent decision states (a; a) is a frameindependent ranking
of actions. For example, in Tversky and Kahneman (1991)s theory of reference-
dependent preferences over consumption, a could be a consumption bundle and q
5Example 8 later will show that E may be empty even Assumption 1 is satised.
6 In scenarios characterized by Assumption 1, in our companion paper "Behavioral Decisions
and Welfare" (2010) we show the existence and stability of behavioral decision outcomes under the
assumption that actions and frames are complements in  and f(a) is increasing in a.
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is a reference point (another commodity bundle). If the decision-maker chooses a
when the pre-decision reference point is q, the post-decision reference point shifts
to a. In this sense, the model of decision-making studied here corresponds to a
situation where "the reference state usually corresponds to the decision-makers
current state." (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, pp. 1046).
Remark 2. Examples of Behavioral Decisions
Consider the special case of our model where Q = fq1; q2g, A = fa1; a2g and
qi = (ai; q) for all q 2 fq1; q2g. We show that even in this special case, M 6= E and
behavioral decision outcomes have properties normally associated with the Nash
equilibria of two-person normal form games. Assume that the preferences  are
represented by an utility function u : A  Q ! <. Let (q) = argmaxa2A u (a; q).
A pure outcome of a behavioral decision is a decision state (~a; ~q) such that ~a 2 (~q)
and ~q = (~a; ~q). A pure outcome of a standard decision problem is one where (a^; q^) 2
argmax(a;q)2AQ u (a; (a; q)). The following examples illustrate this remark.
Example 7. A unique ine¢ cient behavioral decision in dominant actions: ad-
diction
Consider the following payo¤ table:
q1 q2
a1 1  1
a2 2 0
We interpret these payo¤s as an example of addiction where a2 corresponds to
smoking and a1 corresponds to not smoking. The frames qi are interpreted here as
two di¤erent health states of the individual (q2 is less healthy than q1). In this case,
in a behavioral decision problem, the decision-maker always chooses a2 as a2 is the
dominant action for each q: if the individual takes her health state q as given she
always prefers to smoke. The unique behavioral decision outcome is (a2; q2) with a
payo¤ of 0. However, note that the consistent decision state (a1; q1) with a payo¤
of 1 is the only element of M : once the individual takes the feedback from actions
to health states into account, she always chooses not to smoke.
Example 8. No pure action behavioral decision: the grass is always greener on
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the other side
q1 q2
a1 0 1
a2 1 0
We interpret these payo¤s as an example of a situation where the individual makes
a choice between two di¤erent lifestyle. The frames qi denote a specic lifestyle and
ai denotes the action that chooses location qi. Starting from q1, the decision-maker
prefers a2 to a1 while starting from q2, the decision-maker prefers a1 to a2: the
individual always believes that the grass is greener on the other side. There is no
behavioral decision in pure strategies. The decision-maker is, however, indi¤erent
between both the two consistent decision-states (a1; q1) and (a2; q2).
Example 9. Multiple welfare ranked equilibria: aspirations
q1 q2
a1 1 0
a2 0 2
We interpret these payo¤s as an example of an aspiration failure. Let a1=undertaking
an action that perpetuates the status quo and a2=undertaking an action that changes
the status quo. The frames here are interpreted as aspirations levels, with q1 ="low
aspirations" and q2 ="high aspirations" being the consistent frames associated with
a1 and a2 respectively. When decision-makers aspirations are high, (a2; q2) 
(a1; q2); while when her aspirations are low, (a1; q1)  (a2; q1). In this example,
there are two pure behavioral decision outcomes (a1; q1) and (a2; q2), with (a2; q2)
strictly dominating (a1; q1). Thus, the behavioral decision outcome (a1; q1) is an
instance of an aspirations failure.
Note that the payo¤s in Example 8 can be interpreted as reference dependence
without loss aversion while the payo¤s in Example 9 can be interpreted as refer-
ence dependence with loss aversion (a hypothesis supported by most experimental
evidence).
Remark 3. Stackelberg vs. Nash Equilibrium
In a purely formal sense, a standard (respectively, behavioral) decision problem
with endogenous frames can be viewed as the Stackelberg (respectively, Nash) equi-
librium of a dual self intra-personal game where one self chooses actions and the
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other self chooses frames. This equivalence, though purely formal, makes the point
that in a behavioral decision problem (in contrast to standard decision problem),
the individual imposes an externality on himself that he doesnt fully internalize.
Example 8 demonstrates that, in general, E may be empty even when M isnt.
However, given that a behavioral decision outcome can be interpreted as a Nash
equilibrium of a two person game, as long as A0 andQ are nite sets, a mixed strategy
behavioral decision outcome always exists. Under assumption 1, an existence result
for E when a and q are complements can be adapted from Ghosal (2011).
Remark 4. Linking Standard and Behavioral Decisions
Consider the following condition on preferences:
C^ : For any consistent decision states (a; q) and (a0; q0) such that (a; q)  (a0; q0),
(a; q)  (a0; q).
Fix the consistent states (a; q), (a0; q0). Condition (C^) states that if the consistent
state (a; q) is preferred to the consistent state (a0; q0), then the action a weakly
dominates the action a0 at the frame q. Note that preferences in Example 9 satises
(C^) while the preferences in Example 7 violate (C^). We are now in a position to
prove the following useful result:
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, M  E if and only if (C^)
holds.
Proof. Under Assumption 1, M is non-empty. Suppose (a; f(a)) 2 M . As
(a; f(a))  (a0; f(a0)) for all (a0; f(a0)) with a0 2 A0, by (C^), (a; f(a))  (a0; f(a)). It
follows that (a; f(a)) 2 E. Next, suppose, by contradiction, (a; f(a)) 2 M \ E but
(C^) doesnt hold. As (a; f(a)) 2 M , (a; f(a))  (a0; f(a0)) for all a0 2 A0. As, by
assumption, condition (C^) doesnt hold, there exists a0 2 A0 such that (a0; f(a)) 
(a; f(a)). But, then, (a; f(a)) =2 E, a contradiction.
Note that even when condition (C^) holds, if Assumption 1 fails to be satised,
the intersection of M and E is empty, as the following example shows:
Example 10: The feedback function is:
q1 q2 q3
a1 q1 q1 q1
a2 q2 q2 q2
a3 q3 q1 q2
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Notice that, in this case, the non-empty set of feasible, consistent decision states
is (ai; qi), i = 1; 2. Assume that the preferences  are represented by an utility
function u : AQ! < and the payo¤ table is
q1 q2 q3
a1 1 0 0
a2 0 2 0
a3 0 3 0
Condition (C^) is satised as (a2; q2)  (a1; q1) and (a2; q2)  (a1; q2). However,
M = f(a2; q2)g and E = f(a1; q1)g. 
3 Choice with Frames or Ancillary Conditions
In this section, we present the key features of the analysis of choice with frames
or ancillary conditions studied by BR and RS. We assume that both A and Q are
non-empty nite sets containing at least two elements each.
Both BR and RS study generalized (or extended) choice problems (A; q) where
q is a frame or an ancillary condition. Both BR and RS make the point that, in
practice, it is di¢ cult to draw a distinction between characteristics of elements in A
and variables in Q; which could also be viewed as characteristics of elements in A.
An individuals choices are described by a correspondence c(A0; q)  A0 for each
non-empty feasible set A0  A. Further, c(A0; q) is non-empty for all pairs (A0; q).7
Dene aP b8 i¤ for all admissible (A0; q) with a; b 2 A0, b =2 c(A0; q): when aP b,
following BR, a is strictly unambiguously chosen over b.9 Dene aRb i¤  aP b:
there is some generalized choice problem where both a and b are present and a is
chosen. Dene xIy i¤ xRy and yRx: there is some generalized choice problem
where both a and b are present and a is chosen and some other generalized choice
problem where both a and b are present and b is chosen. BR show that R is
necessarily complete: for any a and b the individual must necessarily choose either a
or b from any (fa; bg ; q). Moreover, they also show that none of the binary relations
7RS study choice functions while BR allow for choice correspondences.
8For ease of exposition, we follow BR although we note that RS also derive a preference relation
similar to P .
9 In words, the statement "aP b" means that whenever a and b are available, b is never chosen.
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need be transitive although they do show that P  is acyclic i.e. for any a1,...,aK , if
akP
ak+1 then  aKP a1. BR, then, go on to make the following denition:
Denition (Weak Welfare Optimum, Bernheim and Rangel, 2009 ): It is possi-
ble to strictly improve on a choice a 2 A0 if there is b 2 A0 such that bP a. When a
strict improvement is impossible, a is dened as a Weak Welfare Optimum relative
to some feasible set A0 (where a 2 A0).
In using a Weak Welfare Optimum to rank actions, BR construct a frame-
independent ranking of actions. In e¤ect, BR take the position that all frames
are normatively irrelevant. The following result underpins their welfare analysis:
Result 1 (FACT 1, Bernheim and Rangel, 2007 ): If a 2 c(A0; q) for some
(A0; q), then a is a weak welfare optimum relative to actions in A0.
4 Choice and Welfare
In this section, we compare and contrast the normative implications of the decision
model introduced in Section 2 with that of BR and RS described in Section 3. We
only consider decision scenarios characterized by either Assumption 1 or Assumption
2.
The framework of decision making studied in Section 2 takes the position that
post-decision frames are normatively relevant while BRs position, given their def-
inition of a Weak Welfare Optimum, is that frames are normatively irrelevant. A
rational decision-maker in the former normative position chooses over consistent
decision states. In BRs normative position, however, the rational decision-maker
chooses among actions independently of the frame.
In general, for RS and BR, what matters for welfare is the revealed preference
binary relation P  based on behavioral choice. In contrast, what matters for welfare
purposes in our model is the ranking of feasible consistent decision states where
both actions and frames matter. By assumption, the "rational" ranking of actions
is complete and transitive; however, P  need not be complete and is acyclic. The
question then is whether the two rankings, P  and %, agree where both are dened.
Observe that the ranking of the preference relation % over the set of feasible
consistent decision states corresponds to that of a standard decision-maker and we
refer to this as the "rational" ranking of decision states.
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To begin with, consider scenarios characterized by Assumption 1 where the "ra-
tional" ranking of decision states directly induces a unique ranking of actions (i.e.,
the "rational" ranking of consistent decision states (a; f(a)) induces a unique, com-
plete ranking of actions in A0). We can then ask whether this ranking agree with
BR ranking P  where both are dened. The following proposition claries the rela-
tionship of the two rankings:
Proposition 2: Given Assumption 1, if condition (C^) holds, there is no pair of
actions a; a0 such that (a; f(a))  (a0; f(a0)) and a0P a.
Proof. If for all q, (a0; q)  (a; q), by Result 1, for BR a0P a. We need to
ensure that there are no a and a0 such that (i) (a; f(a))  (a0; f(a0)) and (ii) for
all q, (a0; q)  (a; q). By Proposition 1, the conjunction of (i) and (ii) is ruled out
whenever (C^) holds. 
Proposition 2 shows that whenever M  E, the unique complete "rational"
ranking over actions agrees with BRs ranking of actions where both are dened.
Example 7 shows how this condition may fail. In example 7, the "rational"
ranking of actions ranks a1 over a2 but clearly, a2P a1.
As already noted in Section 2, Remark 1, the case of reference dependent pref-
erences is represented by setting Q = A and f(a) = a. The "rational" ranking of
feasible, consistent decision states (a; a) is a frameindependent ranking of actions.
Munro and Sugden (2003), in their reformulation of Tversky and Kahneman, dene
a concept of reference-neutral preference. Their denition of loss aversion implies
condition (C^) (i.e., if a0 is preferred to a in the reference neutral sense, then a0 is
preferred to a when the reference point is a0). Therefore, in this case, the "rational"
ranking of consistent decision-states agrees with BRs ranking.
Consider, next, the case where Assumption 2 prevails (exogenous frames). Ob-
serve that the "rational" ranking of decision states in this case does not induce a
ranking solely over actions. We state the following result as an immediate conse-
quence of the analysis presented so far:
Proposition 3. Given Assumption 2, there is no pair of actions a; a0 and frame
q such that (a; q)  (a0; q) and a0P a.
Proof: Under assumption 2, the set of feasible consistent decision states is
(a; q0), a 2 A0 and E = f(a; q) : (a; q)  (a0; q) for all a0 2 A and q 2 Qg = M (i.e.
behavioral and standard decision-making are equivalent). But, then, there is no a; a0
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and q such that (a; q)  (a0; q) and a0P a. 
Proposition 3 shows that with exogenous frames, the set of weak welfare optima
derived solely from observed choice contain all the actions corresponding to elements
in M so that the "rational" ranking of consistent decision states agrees with, via
their projection on the set of actions, with BRs ranking where both are dened.
However, the inclusion of the weak welfare optima induced by the "rational" rank-
ing of consistent decision states in the set of weak welfare optima consistent with
observed choice may be strict as in Example 9.
5 Policy Implications
What are the policy implications of our model?
Thaler and Sunstein (2003) recommend a type of intervention called libertarian
paternalism. They argue that, in the cases in which the choice is reference-dependent
(e.g. status quo bias or default option bias), the social planner should choose the
reference point or default option in order to steer peoples choices in desirable direc-
tions. In this way, the social planner would achieve her goal of maximizing peoples
welfare without forcing anybody to do anything they wouldnt do.
To what extent are their conclusions a¤ected when reference points (frames)
adjust quickly to actions? If there are multiple welfare ranked behavioral decision
outcomes, as in Example 9, then the interventions that determine an initial reference
point might have an impact by selecting which decision outcomes the decision-maker
converges to, as a frame manipulation can move the decision-maker to a welfare
dominating decision outcome. In general, manipulation of frames would t with
situations where M  E.
However, in cases such as Example 7 and Example 8 where either the inter-
section of the decision outcomes of a standard decision problem and those of a
behavioral decision problem is empty (i.e. M \E = ), frame manipulations would
not necessarily result in welfare improvements or have no e¤ect on behavior in the
"long-run".
On the face of it, an intervention directed at welfare maximization would have
to be paternalistic in a stronger sense of constraining individual choice. In general,
however, with incomplete information about individual preferences and feedback
18
e¤ects, direct policy intervention along the lines of "soft" paternalism (changing
frames) or "hard" paternalism (constraining individual choice) could make matters
worse.
One possible policy recommendation in scenarios with incomplete information
about an individuals preferences is to directly act on the way in which a person in-
ternalizes the feedback e¤ect from actions to frames. Examples of such policies could
be psychotherapy sessions, projects aiming to foster peoples emotional intelligence
and empowerment, etc.
To x ideas, consider Example 7. In this example, if the individual doesnt take
the feedback e¤ect from actions to psychological states into account, she always
chooses a2 (smoking) over a1 (not smoking); however, the reverse would be true, if
she took the feedback into account. Let , 0    1, denote the probability with
which the individual does take the feedback e¤ect into account. A straightforward
computation shows that as long as  > 12 , the individual will choose a1 over a2
regardless the pre-decision frame. Therefore, as long as the individual takes the
feedback e¤ect into account with a high enough probability, she will choose not to
smoke so that interventions that increase the probability with which an individual
internalizes the feedback e¤ect could result in welfare improvements.
Likewise, a policy intervention that might work in Example 9 is an "empow-
erment" policy, that would help the individual to become aware of her "internal
constraints" and thus "gaining control over her own life10."
6 Final Remarks
The results reported here have some empirical caveats. Both, the endogenous frames
and the feedback-map are key variables for policy considerations, though they are not
directly observable or even inferred from choice behavior. One possible approach
to identify these "unobservable" may be to use evidence from neuroscience and
psychology on the neural processes driving decision making.
Extending the one-person model studied here to n players, dynamic and se-
quential decision scenarios are topics for future research.
10See for instance Appadurai (2004) on the "capacity to aspire" or World Bank (2002) and Stern
(2004) on Empowerment.
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